Introduction 1
The aim of this essay is to investigate Wittgenstein's well-known, yet obscure, objection to the views of Frege and Russell on deductive inference and its justification.
The objection, such as it is, is set out at Tractatus 2 5.132:
If p follows from q, I can make an inference from q to p; deduce p from q. The method of inference is to be gathered from the two propositions alone. Only they themselves can justify the inference. "Laws of inference" The passage raises two immediate questions. First, what does Wittgenstein mean by "laws of inference"? And, secondly, why would Frege and Russell have thought of these laws as involved in the justification of inference? I will take these questions one at a time.
[1]
Laws of inference
The majority view among scholars who have addressed the first question is that when speaking of "laws of inference" Wittgenstein means to be referring to the inference rules of a formal system. 4 But, whatever the merits of this suggestion, it faces the immediate difficulty that neither Frege nor Russell understood the term "laws of inference" so narrowly as to refer only to inference rules. In considering whether the basic laws of logic ought to be called "axioms," Frege says:
5 Traditionally, what is called an axiom is a thought whose truth is certain without, however, being provable by a chain of logical inferences. The laws of logic, too, are of this nature. Some people may nevertheless be inclined to refrain from ascribing the name 'axiom' to these general laws of all inference, [allgemeinen Gesetze alles Schlieβens] but rather wish to reserve it for the basic laws of a more restricted field. (my translation and emphasis)
Here, clearly, Frege is treating the expression "general laws of all inference" as a variant upon "laws of logic".
That Russell took "laws of inference" to encompass more than inference rules is suggested by a passage in "Necessity and Possibility," a paper he gave to the Oxford Philosophical Society in 1905. He writes: 6 There are certain general propositions, which we may enumerate as the laws of deduction: such are "if not-p is false, then p is true", "if p implies not-q, then q implies not-p" [and] "if p implies q and q implies r, then p implies r"; in all we need about ten such principles...
. (Emphasis my own.)
Because Russell says in a footnote to § 13 of the Principles that "[he does] not distinguish between inference and deduction," it seems reasonable to suppose that the expression "laws of deduction" figures in this passage merely as a stylistic variant upon "laws of inference." But if so, then Russell, too, would appear to be taking "laws of inference" to include logical laws.
(Notice that in both of these passages when Frege and Russell speak of "the laws of logic" or "the laws of deduction" they have in mind specifically primitive or basic logical laws. Since at other times they use these expressions to refer to the primitive laws and theorems of their systems, we shall need to remain alert to this ambiguity.)
[2]
The justification of inference 
Ricketts takes
Wittgenstein's criticism to be meant to apply in one way to Russell and in quite another to Frege. Each suggestion has considerable initial appeal, but I will argue that as exegesis neither is ultimately successful.
Against Russell, the criticism is supposed focus on (what Ricketts alleges to be)
Russell's failure adequately to distinguish inference rules from logical laws.
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As Ricketts sees the matter, this confusion is bound up with a mistaken view of the way in which (what we would recognize as) inference rules serve to license the inferences they govern.
According to Ricketts, Russell sees inference ruleswhich for Ricketts's Russell are not to be distinguished from the laws of logicas conferring their licence only by serving as premises in arguments. 10 Accordingly, Ricketts presents Wittgenstein as seeking to expose the mistake in such a view by means of a (tacit) appeal to Lewis Carroll's wellknown regress argument.
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To illustrate: suppose modus ponens were taken to function as a premise. Then the argument from p and 'if p then q', to the conclusion q would actually take the following form: p p⊃q (p.p⊃q)⊃q Therefore, q
Here modus ponens is supposed to have been formulated as a proposition rather than a rule. But, in this role it will be powerless to license the inference to the conclusion q, since the argument is now of a new form, one not covered by modus ponens. Nor may we remedy the situation by appealing to some new inference rule, because its incorporation as a premise will again alter the overall shape of the argument.
Ricketts concedes that this story cannot be the whole explanation of Wittgenstein's critique of "laws of inference," since there is no reason to suppose that
Frege confused inference rules with axioms. He therefore offers a separate account of how the criticism of 5.132 is supposed to apply to Frege. I will turn to this account in a moment, but first I want to raise some doubts about the way the criticism is supposed to apply to Russell.
My main concern is that Ricketts's interpretation portrays Wittgenstein as guilty of an uninterestingly uncharitable reading of Russell. For Russell was in fact perfectly clear about the distinction between inference rules and logical laws. Indeed, as we shall see, he was clear about this distinction precisely because he saw that a failure to respect it would lead directly to Carroll's regress.
In the course of an early proof in Principia Mathematica Russell and Whitehead remark: "The principle of deduction gives the general rule according to which the inference is made, but is not itself a premise in the inference. If we treated it as a premise, we should need either it or some other general rule to enable us to infer the desired conclusion, and thus we should gradually acquire an increasing accumulation of premises without ever being able to make any inference." 12 And in the next paragraph, having mentioned that principles of deduction may also function as premises in an inferencethat is, when they no longer play their inference-licensing role-they continue: "This distinction between the two uses of principles of deduction is of some philosophical importance, and in the above proofs we have indicated it by putting the rule of inference in square brackets." 13 So for Russell and Whitehead the distinction between the use of a principle of deduction as a premise and its use as a rule is important enough to be embodied in the very symbolism of Principia.
14 Making the same point in the earlier Principles of Mathematics, Russell says:
"We may observe...that in a particular inference, the rule according to which the inference proceeds is not required as a premise." 15 And he goes on to argue that if we were to require the rule to function as a premise-if we were to do what is "formally necessary" 16 -we would be faced with a Carroll-style regress. Russell concludes that the rule according to which the inference proceeds should be seen as "a respect in which the formalism breaks down," and he recommends that such rules be accorded the status of informal principles that are employed in making inferences but not recorded as lines in proofs. 17 Ricketts does not say why he takes Russell to have confused inference rules with logical laws, but I suspect that his reading is based on at least one of the following considerations. First, in section 18 of the Principles, Russell applies the term "axiom" to inference rules and logical laws indiscriminately.
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This might seem to suggest that he is insensitive to the differences between them. It ought not to mislead us, however, for even while speaking this way, Russell is at pains to emphasize the peculiar status of inference rules among axioms. Thus in section 18, while he lists several axioms in the form of statements containing implicitly quantified variables (for example, (6): "If p implies q and q implies r, then p implies r"), he formulates the one "axiom" that we would call an inference rule very differently:
(4) A true hypothesis in an implication may be dropped, and the consequent asserted. This is a principle incapable of formal symbolic statement, and illustrating the essential limitations of symbolism.
The rule is recorded as a permission, rather than as a statement of fact, and its anomalous status is clearly flagged. There may be room for debate about what it means to say that the principle is "incapable of formal symbolic statement," but a comparison with Principles § 45 strongly suggests that it means that such rules cannot be recorded as premises in the deductions in which they are used. It seems likely, therefore, that by calling modus ponens an indemonstrable "axiom" Russell merely wishes to emphasize that it forms part of the fundamental basis of mathematics, not that it is to be construed as functioning as a premise in arguments.
What I think is most likely to be driving Ricketts's interpretation, however, is
Russell's speaking in Principia of one and the same "principle of deduction" as having two kinds of use: a "use for implication" and a "use for inference." 19 But, so long as one is clear-as Russell was-that a principle can be "used for inference" without functioning as a premise in that very inference, this way of conceiving the matter will not lead to a ii) All mammals are vertebrates; Therefore, iii) All whales are vertebrates.
According to Ricketts's Frege, i) and ii) do not exhaust the grounds for the assertion of iii). Rather, iii) rests additionally upon certain laws of logic. So in order to render the grounds of our inference fully explicit, we shall first need to prove the conclusion iii), by deriving the following logical law from basic laws of logic:
We then proceed to instantiate the second-order variables in iv), to obtain: v) (∀x)(x is a whale ⊃ x is a mammal) ⊃ ((∀x)(x is a mammal ⊃ x is a vertebrate) ⊃ (∀x)(x is a whale ⊃ x is a vertebrate)).
The conclusion, iii), then follows from i), ii) and v) by two applications of modus ponens.
Ricketts takes 5.132 to be opposing the idea that logical laws are ever needed to mediate inferences in this way. His view certainly provides a plausible sense in which logical laws might be thought to "justify" inferences; for on this account they do so because they form part of the basis for the assertion of the conclusion. It is far from clear, What Wittgenstein actually says, however, is that laws of inference are superfluous because the justification is afforded by premise and conclusion alone. So whatever Wittgenstein means by the "justification of an inference," it must be something in which the conclusion itself can figure. But since the conclusion will not figure among the grounds of any inference worth making, the dispute about "justification" cannot, after all, be one about what ought to be included in a full articulation of an inference's grounds. So although Ricketts certainly identifies a sense in which logical laws might be held to be involved in the justification of inferences, it cannot be the sense that is relevant to the interpretation of 5.132.
[ If the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others, this expresses itself in relations in which the forms of these propositions stand to one another, and we do not need to put them in these relations first by connecting them with one another in a proposition; for these relations are internal, and exist as soon as, and by the very fact that, the propositions exist. According to this theory a proposition is more or less necessary in proportion as there are more or fewer other propositions to which it is logically prior, p is logically prior to q if q implies p but p does not imply q.
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In other words, a proposition is more necessary in proportion as there are more propositions which imply it but which it does not imply. So, for instance, "Someone is clever" is more necessary than "Russell is clever," since anything "Someone is clever" implies is already implied by "Russell is clever," but not conversely.
Russell recognizes that this account will have to employ a notion of implication other than material implication. A false proposition materially implies all propositions and a true proposition is materially implied by every proposition; so using material implication in the account will dictate that all truths are on one level of necessity, and all falsehoods on another.
Because of this problem Russell is prompted to explore the concept of logical entailment, which he terms "deducibility"and on one occasion 27 "logical deducibility."
He sees this as an ordinary concept in need of precise definition. He views his task as one of demarcating a class of material conditionals"implications," as he calls themin which the consequent is intuitively felt to be a necessary consequence of the antecedent.
The relevant cases are those in which the truth of the material conditional, "p implies q,"
is known independently of the falsity of p and the truth of q. He says:
... in the practice of inference, it is plain that something more than implication must be concerned. The reason that proofs are used at all is that we can sometimes perceive that q follows from p, when we should not otherwise know that q is true; while in other cases; "p implies q" is only to be inferred either from the falsehood of p or from the truth of q....What we require is a logical distinction between these two cases. (Ibid., p. 515)
Russell is pointing to the need to distinguish the fact that p materially implies q, from the fact that q is logically entailed by, or in his terminology "deducible from," p. He defines the latter notion as follows.
We may then say that q is deducible from p if it can be shown by means of the above principles [i.e. the axioms and inference rules of Russell's system] that p implies q. (Ibid.) So q is deducible from p just in case 'p⊃q' is derivable in Russell's system.
Russell observes that the definition captures the extension of the concept he is seeking to define:
This meaning of deducible is purely logical, and covers, I think, exactly the cases in which, in practice, we can deduce a proposition q from a proposition p without assuming either that p is false or that q is true. (Ibid.) Finally, having defined the notion of "deducibility," Russell uses it to explain the intuitive notion of a valid argument. He writes:
It is noteworthy that, in all actual valid deduction, whether or not the material is of a purely logical nature, the relation of premise to conclusion, in virtue of which we make the deduction, is one of those contemplated by the laws of logic 28 or deducible from them (Ibid., p. 517).
Notice that Russell regards the relevant material implication as licensing the inference.
He calls it the relation "in virtue of which" we make the deduction. As long as the implication is one that holds for reasons other than the falsity of the antecedent or the truth of the consequent, it will licence inferences from antecedent to consequent. Such cases are those in which the obtaining of the implication is grounded in the laws of inference. In such cases the implication obtains either because it is "contemplated" by the (primitive) laws of logic (that is, is an instance of one of the axioms), or because it can be derived from these laws using the inference rules of Russell system. 29 Although the 1905 paper containing Russell's account of deducibility is a relatively obscure source, the view it contains is suggested by passages in Russell's more public writings. 30 At the beginning of part I of Principia, in a section entitled "The Theory of Deduction," Russell characterizes the subject treated in Principia as "the theory of how one proposition can be inferred from another." 31 He says that "in order that one proposition may be inferred from another it is necessary that the two should have that relation which makes one the consequence of the other." So, given this characterization of the subject treated in Principia, it seems plausible that Russell takes the theorems of his system to report the obtaining of the logical entailment relation. In Principia Russell misleadingly calls this relation "implication," but in view of the clarity shown in his 1905 paper about the distinction between implication and deducibility it seems likely that what he has in mind here is the restriction of the implication relation to those implications that can be shown to hold on the basis of logic alone. Such implications are, after all, just the theorems of the "theory of deduction." If this is correct, then Russell's view would seem to be that the relation that justifies inference is just the relation of logically grounded implication. (I shall call an implication 'logically grounded' just in case it is derivable as a theorem of Russell's system.)
These later remarks of Russell suggest that he is no longer thinking of the definition given in the 1905 paper as merely capturing the extension of the logical entailment relation. Rather, he now seems to be regarding the relation of logical entailment as consisting in a special kind of implication. In this connection it is worth noting that after 1905, Russell no longer treats the relation that obtains between premise and conclusion in a sound and valid argument as a primitive relation-the so-called "therefore" relation of the Principles. Russell really means to be speaking here of properties of the logical entailment relation, we get a clear statement of the view that I have suggested Wittgenstein means to be opposing. For Russell, the laws of inference (understood as the primitive logical laws and inference rules of his system) justify inferences because they logically ground the relation of material implication that obtains between premise and conclusion in a valid argument.
Strictly speaking, it is the fact that this relation is logically grounded that justifies the inference, but because (primitive) laws of inference provide the grounding in question, they can be said to justify inferences in a derivative sense. By contrast, Wittgenstein will say that the "ordinary procedure of deduction" is justified not by the relation of implication between premise and conclusion being one that is counted logically grounded by Russell's "theory of deduction," but by an internal relation between the forms of the propositions involved.
Because the envisaged grounding is grounding by the laws of Russell's system, Russell's account of deducibility turns out to be a system-relative one. What it is for p to entail q is for 'p⊃q' to be derivable from the axioms and inference rules of Russell's system. I suspect, however, that Wittgenstein would not have regarded this feature of Russell's view as irremediably problematic. For he appears to have regarded Russell as having a non-system-relative conception of a primitive proposition of logic (or logically primitive inference rule), viz. as one having the highest degree of psychological selfevidence. 33 Reading him in this way, Wittgenstein may have charitably reconstructed Russell's view so that logically grounded implications were understood to be just those that are derivable from intrinsically primitive logical laws and inference rules.
A Fregean view that might be the target of Wittgenstein's criticism is suggested in a passage from "Foundations of Geometry: Second Series," where Frege is discussing, not logical entailment exactly, but the related notion of the "dependence" of one thought on a group of others.
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He writes:
Let Ω be a group of true thoughts. Let a thought G follow from one or several of the thoughts of this group by means of a logical inference such that apart from the laws of logic, no proposition not belonging to Ω is used. Let us now form a new group of thoughts by adding the thought G to the group Ω. Call what we have just performed a logical step. Now if through a sequence of such steps, where every step takes the result of the preceding one as its basis, we can reach a group of thoughts that contains the thought A, then we call A dependent upon group Ω. If this is not possible, then we call A independent of Ω.
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Frege offers a precise characterization of the dependence of a thought on a group of true thoughts, Ω, in terms of the yet-to-be-clarified notions of "logical inference" and "law of what it is for one true thought to "follow from" another. An account, that is, not of the relation of logical entailment, but of the restriction of that relation to the class of true thoughts. As Frege admits, this is only a sketch: further work will need to be done to clarify the notions of "logical inference" and "law of logic."
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The need for further work could be avoided if we were to stipulate certain inferences and laws to be primitively logical, but then we would have defined only a notion of dependence-relative-to-a-stipulation. Briefly, Burge and Jeshion each claim that, quite apart from any psychological notion of "self-evidence," Frege employed a non-psychological notion which had to do with a proposition's place in a hierarchy of truths, structured by objective relations of justification. A truth is "self-evident" in this non-psychological sense if-in Jeshion's phrase -it is "self-supporting." That is to say, if by its very nature it derives its justification from no other truths, but contains its own evidence or support within it.
When this is so, the truth in question is in an absolute sense "unprovable," but in virtue of its essentially self-grounding character it may be capable of grounding other truths. 40 According to Jeshion, a thought's being psychologically obvious is good evidence that it is self-supporting, but self-supportingness is not constituted by psychological obviousness. And, most importantly for our purposes, a truth occupies its position in the objective hierarchy quite independently of our decision to choose it as an axiom. 48 We also know that "Foundations of Geometry: Second Series," was published in the Jahresbericht der Deutschen MathematikerVereinigung in 1906, but it is not one of the works that Wittgenstein discusses, or mentions having read.
On the other hand, we do have reason to think that by the time of writing the Tractatus Wittgenstein had read Frege's Grundlagen, and this work contains at least one passage which gestures toward the kind of account we have seen outlined above. In the course of an argument against the adequacy of inductively established arithmetical lawsan argument whose details need not concern us-Frege observes: 49 Instead of linking our chain of deductions direct to any matter of fact, we can leave the fact on one side, while adopting its content in the form of a condition. By substituting in this way conditions for facts throughout the whole of a train of reasoning, we shall finally reduce it to a form in which a certain result is made dependent on a certain series of conditions. So when we have a derivation of p⊃q from basic logical laws, we have a case where the chain of deductions beginning with p and ending with q has been "reduced to the form where" q is dependent on p. But since Frege is here in effect (tacitly) assuming one direction of the deduction theorem: (viz., if p q, then  p⊃q), this means that for him q is dependent on p whenever q is derivable from p. Moreover, if we regard Frege here as envisaging the process of "substituting conditions for facts" and so on to be reversible, (and so as in effect tacitly committed to both directions of the deduction theorem), we shall have a case of the notion of dependence being cashed in terms of derivability: q is dependent on p iff  p⊃q, that is, iff p q. So the kind of "proof- propositions they are. There is no need to invoke any logical framework, so to speak, holding premise and conclusion in place so that the relation of material implication obtaining between them may qualify also as a relation of entailment. Something very close to this thought is evident in the "darkly metaphorical" passage quoted earlier:
If the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others, this expresses itself in the relations in which the forms of these propositions stand to one another, and we do not need to put them in these relations first by connecting them with one another in a proposition; on the contrary, these relations are internal, and exist as soon as, and by the very fact that, the propositions exist. (5.131) (My translation)
As I read it, this passage is claiming that in order to appreciate that q follows from p there is no need to first show that the proposition "if p then q" can be known to hold on the basis of the laws of logic alone. This is so because we do not need to think of the validity of the inference as owed to the logical truth of the corresponding conditional (which, on the view Wittgenstein is opposing, amounts to this conditional's being derivable from primitive logical laws). Rather, the validity of the inference is owed merely to an internal relation between the forms of the premise and the conclusion. The holding of this relation is not something that can be put into words. It is something that shows itself forth when we recognize the propositions for what they are: "That the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of other propositions, we perceive from the structure of the propositions" (5.13).
This is relatively clear, but at 5.11 Wittgenstein muddies the issue by seeming to express a rival conception of logical entailment. He says:
If the truth-grounds which are common to a number of propositions are all also truth-grounds of some one proposition, we say that the truth of this proposition follows from the truth of those propositions.
This remark needs to be handled with some delicacy, since it seems to invite something analogous to the criticism that John Etchemendy has recently levelled against Tarski's analysis of logical consequence.
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By focusing on the fact that the truth-grounds of the premises are also truth-grounds of the conclusion, we seem to leave out the fact that the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. This idea is at least more It is because we can think of the rows of a sign in the truth-table notation as corresponding to the unofficial idea of "truth-possibilities," and the rows on which a "T" is entered as corresponding to the unofficial idea of "truthgrounds," that we recognize the truth-table notion as a good notation for making clear the internal relatedness of certain propositions.
By framing propositions in a perspicuous notation such as the truth -table notation we make more plausible Wittgenstein's idea that propositions contain their own resources for revealing themselves to stand in the inferential relationships in which they stand (cf.
6.1265). If in practice we sometimes need to derive a conditional in an axiom system in order to recognize the corresponding inference as valid, that is only because we are creatures with quite limited logical capacities. According to Wittgenstein, an axiom system provides for what he calls proof in logic, which is to say, the derivation of tautologies from tautologies (cf. 6.126). Unlike the proof of one senseful proposition on the basis of another, this kind of proof serves as no more than a "mechanical aid to the recognition of tautology in complicated cases" (6.1262) (my translation). Most importantly, an axiom system is not to be viewed as systematizing any supposed body of propositionally expressible "logical knowledge."
The criticisms stated at 5.132 do not, however, exhaust Wittgenstein's critique.
The remark about all propositions of logic being "of equal status" at 6.127 is a further implicit criticism, since it challenges the conception of intrinsically primitive logical laws upon which a non-system-relative conception of entailment rests. When we infer from p to q: "The method of inference is to be gathered from the two propositions alone" (5.132). The "method of inference" is the particular form of argument employed in the inference. It is to be gathered "from the two propositions alone" because it is something which can be conveyed only by being exhibited in
propositions. The point is a corollary of Wittgenstein's denial of the expressibility of logical form. He says:
Propositions cannot represent logical form: this mirrors itself in propositions.
That which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent. That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.
Propositions show the logical form of reality.
They exhibit it. (4.121) (My translation)
These remarks apply to "logical form" in a rather wide sense, but it is clear from the comment on this thought at 4.1211 that Wittgenstein is thinking, among other things, of the inexpressibility of the internal relatedness of the forms of premise and conclusion in a valid argument. He says:
Thus a proposition "fa" shows that the object a occurs in its sense, two propositions 'fa' and 'ga' show that the same object is mentioned in both of them. Wittgenstein says that a relation is internal if it is unthinkable that it should fail to relate its actual relata (4.123). If one shade of blue is brighter than another, then it is unthinkable that these very shades should not be so related (4.123). Wittgenstein does not explain what it is for a state of affairs to be "thinkable," but one supposes he must have something non-psychological in mind--perhaps a state of affairs is thinkable in
Wittgenstein's sense just in case there is a proposition that expresses its obtaining. I shall pursue this idea in more detail later, but first I want to delve a little into the pre-history of Wittgenstein's discussion of the notion of "internality."
In presenting entailment as an internal relation, Wittgenstein is issuing a direct challenge to Russell's view that all relations are external. Russell, in turn, adopted this But it does not seem likely that Russell is taking himself to be committed to the externality of relations in Wittgenstein's sense. His view would seem be, rather, that all relations are "not-internal," in whatever sense Bradley attaches to the term "internal."
For Bradley, a relation is "internal"or in his terminology "intrinsical"when it "effects" or "passes into" or again, "penetrates the being of" its terms. There are such facts as that one object has a certain relation to another...[and such facts] do not imply that the two objects have ... any intrinsic property distinguishing them from two objects which do not have the relation in question.
If we take "imply" here to mean something stronger than "materially imply," we might both the P's and the Q's agree in all their intrinsic properties, and the members of only one pair stand related by logical entailment. But this is plainly false, for the terms in question, being propositions, are items for which a lack of intrinsic difference amounts to a lack of numerical distinctness. If two propositions share all their intrinsic properties, they must contain exactly the same constituents, and must combine these constituents in precisely the same way; but then they will just be the same proposition. 65 So to suppose that the relation relates one pair of propositions at one world, and fails to relate an intrinsically identical pair at another, is just to suppose it equally possible (hence equally thinkable) that the relation of entailment should either relate or not relate one and the same pair of propositions. But, that was the very position we were trying to avoid by pursuing the detour by way of Bradley's conception of an internal relation. (We pursued the detour in the belief that not even Russell would wish to allow that a proposition could be conceived as having a range of different conceivable positions in the inferential network.) So Russell must, in the end, deny that there are any such worlds as the ones we have tried to describe; and he must, accordingly, judge the relation of logical entailment to be internal.
There are two very different kinds of conclusion we might draw from these reflections. On the one hand, we might say that once the thesis that all relations are external has been made clearby giving a precise sense to the notion of externalityit is found to be false. But, alternatively, we might say that because he must reject our construal of the notion of internality Russell has in fact failed to attach any meaning to the expression "external," and so has failed to invest the sentence "All relations are external" with sense.
Russell seems to want to occupy an impossible space between these two positions.
He isn't sure what Bradley means by calling a relation "internal," but he is confident that Bradley must mean something, and certain that, whatever that should turn out to be, the truth is that there are no internal relations in that very sense. In effect, Russell keeps his thesis viable by deferring scrutiny of its key notions. It is as though he takes himself to see matters clearly enough to know that Bradley is wrong, but not sufficiently clearly to know what he is wrong about.
The Tractatus contains a strand of thought that is deeply critical of this philosophical attitude. Where Russell would take himself to have propounded a substantive, defensible thesis--albeit one requiring clarification--Wittgenstein would take him to have failed to attach meaning to certain of his words, and so to have uttered nonsensealbeit nonsense with a strong tendency to pass itself off as sense (cf. 5.4733).
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Given that such a style of criticism is so thoroughly Tractarian in spirit, and so plausibly applicable to the case at hand, one might wonder why Wittgenstein refrains from applying it here. Instead of saying that the question whether all relations are external makes no sense because some terms employed in its formulation lack a meaning, he seems to propose a way of making sense of it. That is to say, he appears to give his own characterization of what it means for a relation to be internal, and to claim that the relation that justifies inference is internal in just this sense. Is he, then, disagreeing with However, the impression that Wittgenstein regards himself as having "taken care of" the question by solving it, begins to evaporate as soon as one scrutinizes the notion of "thinkability" appealed to in Wittgenstein's exposition of internality. Earlier we made do with the following suggestion: To say that a state of affairs (that p) is thinkable is just to say that there is a proposition which says that p. But this proposal needs refining, 67 for we shall have to decide whether, for the purposes of this characterization, tautology and contradiction count as "propositions." And here we seem to be in a bind. If we say they do, we commit ourselves to the thinkability of contradictions. If we say they don't, we commit ourselves to counting the circumstance that either it is raining or is not, as unthinkable. But our intuitive sense is that this is something we can think. After all, it is a logical consequence of something we can think, namely that it is raining.
The best way to respond to this dilemma is to blunt one of its horns. We need to insist that it is not, strictly speaking, thinkable that either it is raining or it is not raining.
To make this ruling plausible we shall have to deny that the technical notion of "thinkability" in play here has very much to do with the intuitive notion of what we can think. Since tautologies do not express "thoughts" in Wittgenstein's technical sense of the term-that is, senseful propositions (4), what they do express, if anything, is not in this sense thinkable.
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Taking such a position would allow us to reformulate the explanation of thinkability by substituting "proposition with sense" for "proposition" in the formulation given above. This would yield the mildly satisfying result that the circumstance that p is thinkable just in case there is a thought (that is, a senseful proposition) which says that p.
But how are we to understand this quantification over thoughts? On the face of it, we are saying that when the state of affairs that p is thinkable, for some q, q is a proposition, q has sense and q says that p, where "q" is a variable which occupies an argument place accessible to names of propositions. 69 We can make sense of this statement only if we can make sense of such sentences as "a has sense," where "a" is a singular term designating a proposition. But because propositions, for Wittgenstein, are facts (cf. 3.12 and 3.14 ), and because facts cannot be named (cf. 3.144), 70 we will not be able to treat these singular terms as Tractarian names. It seems that we will need to treat sentences containing singular terms that purport to designate propositions, as admitting of paraphrase by sentences in which no singular terms purporting to designate propositions occur. 71 However, Wittgenstein provides no proposal that would enable us to pull off this trick. We cannot employ a combination of the description theory of (apparent) names and the theory of descriptions to eliminate the apparent name for a proposition, since, even if we could find a satisfactory description, the resulting application of the theory of descriptions would re-introduce quantification over propositions. Nor can we apply the Notebooks's analysis of a sentence predicating a property of a complex: namely, ϕa.ϕb.aRb = Def ϕ[aRb] 72 (cf. 3.24), for whatever its prospects more generally, the proposal will obviously fail in connection with the kinds of things one will want to say of propositions. (Consider, for example, the result of substituting 'has sense' or 'is a proposition' for 'ϕ' in the above definition.) In the end , then, Wittgenstein's talk of thinkability and his explanation of 'internality' turn out to be in the same boat as Russell's talk of 'internality.' In both cases we have promisory notes, but no satisfactorily completed explications.
Why, then, does Wittgenstein trouble to half formulate the notion of an "internal relation"? Why does he act as though there is a well-defined question whether all relations are external, upon which to take sides? In this case I believe there may be something to the idea of Cora Diamond that for certain heuristic purposes Wittgenstein sometimes behaves as though certain notions to which he has (as yet) 73 attached no meaning make full sense. In the present case, the temporary adoption of this stance at very least has a certain diagnostic value: it enables us to detect various gradations of philosophical error, and to see why someone might have taken claims involving internal relations to make sense.
Consider, for example, a paradigmatic report of the obtaining of a supposedly internal relation: "This shade of blue is darker than that one." I take it that the idea behind Wittgenstein's insistence on the " bi-polarity" of the proposition in his pre-Tractatus writings 74 is that one who took this sentence to make sense could be brought to realise that it fails to say anything by being invited to think through what would be said by its negation. On realizing that there is nothing they succeed in thinking when they attempt this exercise, they will come to see that the original unnegated sentence fails to exclude any coherent state of affairs, and so, after all, fails to express a thought.
Wittgenstein's diagnosis would be that the sentence says nothing because we have failed to attach any significance to the fact that 'is darker than' stands between names of shades of colour (cf. 5.473 & 5.4733). He would add that we are inclined not to notice this because we tend to construe the sentence on the model of the fully senseful sentence: "This patch of cloth is darker than that one," a sentence which contains an expression for a proper external relation. (In so doing, we will have missed the subtle "shift" from a genuine external relation to a "formal," or "pseudo-relation" (cf. 4.123)). We may conclude that Wittgenstein has identified a class of utterances that express no thoughts, even though it is quite natural to take them as expressing thoughts, namely, those utterances to which we are inclined to prefix the phrase: "It is unthinkable that it should not be the case that...."
The notion of an internal relation, which presupposes the notion of thinkability, may also play a role at an earlier stage in our considerations. By temporarily availing oneself of the notion of an internal relation, one may arrive at a more refined--if still ultimately problematic--view of which internal relations there are. One might, for example, be persuaded that the only internal relations are ones that hold or fail to hold of propositions. Wittgenstein's remark that the only necessity is logical necessity (6.37, cf.
6.375) might be taken to suggest such a view, for it invites us to construe talk of internal relations between objects as the expression of an inchoate insight into the obtaining of internal relations between propositions. So, for example, while G. E. Moore says that a complex stands in an internal relation to its constituent part, 75 Wittgenstein says: "A proposition about a complex stands in internal relation to the proposition about its constituent part" (3.24). (The relation in question might be the one "shown forth" by the Notebooks's analysis mentioned above.) I take it that this unofficial view of which internal relations there are, is supposed to play an heuristic role in guiding the project of analysis. Suppose that we help ourselves temporarily to the notion of an internal relation. If we then acquiesce in the Tractatus's view of which internal relations there are-that is, if we come to believe that whatever we formerly regarded as a conceptual connection (e.g., that between being coloured and being extended, or being known and being true) is, in fact, an internal relation of form (that is, a logical entailment) holding between propositions, we will be led to try to analyse all propositions into a form where these connections become fully apparent, and, for Wittgenstein, this will be a form in which propositions reveal themselves to be truthfunctions of elementary propositions.
Thus, by taking a stand on which internal relations there are, we motivate and direct the project of analysis. Once this conception of analysis is accepted and incorporated into our philosophical practice, our talk of "internal relations" can be jettisoned as part of the ladder we are to throw away (cf. 6.54). . A point that we should keep in mind throughout our discussion is that oftenthough, as we shall see, by no means alwaysRussell uses the word "implies" to express the relation of material implication, rather than logical entailment. These passages don't exclude inference rules from the class of 'laws of inference,' and I know of no other that does. See Ricketts, op. cit., p. 7: "Unlike Russell, Frege is absolutely clear on the difference between logical laws and inference rules, as well as the need for both in his axiomatic formulation of logic." Ricketts cites no texts to support his implication that Russell was not clear on the difference.
Notes

